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Abstract
We present FireBERT, a set of three proof-of-concept NLP classifiers hardened
against TextFooler-style word-perturbation by producing diverse alternatives to
original samples. In one approach, we co-tune BERT against the training data and
synthetic adversarial samples. In a second approach, we generate the synthetic
samples at evaluation time through substitution of words and perturbation of em-
bedding vectors. The diversified evaluation results are then combined by voting.
A third approach replaces evaluation-time word substitution with perturbation of
embedding vectors. We evaluate FireBERT for MNLI and IMDB Movie Review
datasets, in the original and on adversarial examples generated by TextFooler. We
also test whether TextFooler is less successful in creating new adversarial samples
when manipulating FireBERT, compared to working on unhardened classifiers. We
show that it is possible to improve the accuracy of BERT-based models in the face
of adversarial attacks without significantly reducing the accuracy for regular bench-
mark samples. We present co-tuning with a synthetic data generator as a highly
effective method to protect against 95% of pre-manufactured adversarial samples
while maintaining 98% of original benchmark performance. We also demonstrate
evaluation-time perturbation as a promising direction for further research, restoring
accuracy up to 75% of benchmark performance for pre-made adversarials, and
up to 65% (from a baseline of 75% orig. / 12% attack) under active attack by
TextFooler.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and prior work
Just as we have seen interesting, easy-to-fabricate but hard-to-explain adversarial attacks against
visual classifiers (Ma et al., 2020; Eykholt et al., 2018), attacks against text classification systems
have been proposed. Earlier examples use misspellings (Li et al., 2018), an attack easily thwarted
with preprocessing (Pruthi et al., 2019) or co-training (Zhu et al., 2019).
In 2019, a group of researchers from MIT, University of Hong Kong, and A*STAR Singapore
published a new approach, creating perturbations focused on flipped classification but minimal
semantic difference. The “TextFooler” project (Jin et al., 2019) used word similarities to generate
adversarial corpora prevailingly understood and classified the same way as the original by humans.
The technique fools BERT near completely on many benchmarks, exposing a potentially dangerous
vulnerability to adversarial attack. TextFooler performs a near exhaustive search for adversarial
samples that come reasonably close to preserving the semantic content of the original. It treats the
classifier as a black box, examining only the classifier probability output to determine the importance
of individual words.
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Recent work to guard against such attacks (Karimi et al., 2020) co-trains a BERT model on embedding
perturbations generated by following the gradients. It achieves small but measurable success. It
picks up earlier work (Goodfellow et al., 2014) which explored (among other methods) adding a
defined noise distribution to input vectors. Goodfellow’s team concluded that adversarial samples
are not finely distributed around input vectors, but, rather, that there are “pockets” of adversarial
classification, and that ensembles will offer no protection against carefully constructed adversarial
samples. Their work was based on MNIST classification, but their claim is that the findings apply
more generally to most networks that feature large linear components. We claim that BERT-based
NLP classifiers are sufficiently removed from simple linear behavior to allow us to take another look
at the effectiveness of ensembles.
TextFooler specifically attacks BERT, not its descendants. Thus our goal is to evaluate our work
against TextFooler directly. We know of no paper attempting to harden against an attack by TextFooler
or any adversary with similarity to its exhaustive approach and degree of success. There are numerous
BERT derivatives, and some claim added robustness (Liu et al., 2019). They may offer additional
resilience above regular BERT against adversarial attack, but, to our knowledge, this has not been
evaluated. The TextFooler paper itself has been recently updated but the code remains unchanged.
Updates to the paper were confined to the analysis and future work suggestions, and are not relevant
to our result. A recent survey of adversarial attacks and defenses (Wang et al., 2019) does not include
TextFooler and makes the claim that adversarial attacks against text are impractical; a statement
which TextFooler’s achievements should put very much in doubt.
2 Primary contribution
MNLI entailment and IMDB sentiment classification accuracy with BERT under adversarial attack by
purely pre-made TextFooled samples (generated with TextFooler on previously known BERT-based
classifiers) can be improved from approximately 0% to close to original performance with a hardened
classifier. TextFooler analysis of (and sample generation on) such a hardened classifier can be made
significantly more difficult (requiring at least 5 times the amount of computation performed for
an attack on an unmodified BERT-based classifier, and failing with at least twice the unmodified
rate). We show that this can be achieved without substantially lowering the regular accuracy for the
above-named benchmarks.
Our principal contribution consists of three classifiers constructed as a defense mechanism against
TextFooler-style attacks, with details discussed below. The code, plus tuned models, hyperparameter
search code and training and evaluation notebooks for these classifiers, in addition to tools for
exploratory data analysis and the actual training and evaluation data, are available at our anonymous
GitHub repository. A summary of our most important results:
• Reducing the error rate on pre-made adversarial samples by 79% (new accuracy 0.800) on
MNLI and 87% (new accuracy 0.872) on IMDB by co-tuning with synthetic samples.
• Reducing the error rate by 62% on both the MNLI and IMDB tasks (to 0.623 and 0.620,
respectively) on the IMDB tasks through evaluation-time vector perturbation.
• Reducing the error rate by 48% (to accuracy 0.545) on the MNLI task under active TextFooler
attack, through evaluation-time vector perturbation.
• We show that TextFooler overfits to a specific, tuned model: Simply re-tuning on the original
data improves accuracy against pre-made adversarial samples significantly.
2.1 Methods
We explore three ways to teach BERT to be more accepting of perturbed sentences while preserving
classification results. All three are applied to both sentiment classification (IMDB) and entailment
classification (MNLI): In approach 1 (“FuSE”), we introduce additional, slightly word-diversified
samples during the evaluation, and make a voting ensemble. In approach 2 (“FIVE”), we shortcut the
search for replacement words and add Gaussian noise to the input-embedding vectors directly. In
approach 3 (“FACT”), we co-tune the classifier with the same diversified samples we use in FuSE.
All three use a shared component to perturb text, which we will explore in more detail. All three
classifiers are built around an underlying BERT-instance. They are implemented as subclasses of the
base classifier, modifying only very specific parts of the behavior.
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2.1.1 SWITCH - "Substituting Words In Text Classification Hardening"
Figure 1: SWITCH
The purpose of our SWITCH component
is to provide sample diversity with retained
classification. SWITCH takes an example
like this: “this movie is truly fun for the
whole family adults and kids will totally
enjoy it!” and produces alternatives like
this: “this photography is sincerely fun for
the whole family matures and teenagers
will perfectly enjoy it !" and “this theatre is
truly fun for the whole family forties and
kiddies will entirely enjoy it !”.
SWITCH uses its own pre-tuned BERT in-
stance for evaluating the gradients for the
input sentence/pair provided, in order to de-
termine which words are important to the
classification. It then uses the same counter-
fitted embeddings employed by TextFooler
to create alternative words. The actual co-
sine similarities are never needed, since
words far away from the original are of no
interest to us. We store a pre-computed
matrix of 100 nearest-neighbor index num-
bers for each word. Replacement words
are filtered through part-of-speech match-
ing, and finally the replacement texts can
optionally be ranked (for closest semantic
similarity to the original) or filtered (for at
least positive similarity value) through the
Universal Sentence Encoder (USE) (Cer
et al., 2018) similarity scores. There is a
random element to SWITCH’s final choice
of alternatives, in order to make it harder
for the exhaustive trial-and-error process of
TextFooler to have a stable target to work
with. Tunable hyperparameters include the
number of words to perturb, the number of
alternative samples to generate, whether to use part-of-speech matching, and whether to employ USE
in either filtering or ranking, plus a multiplier to generate more samples before USE is applied.
2.1.2 TextFooler baseline models
To establish a baseline for our three approaches we obtain the original models provided by the
TextFooler authors which were fine-tuned on bert-base-uncased for the MNLI and IMDB tasks. These
pre-tuned models are the BERT instances fed into SWITCH for querying and active searching of
diverse candidates.
2.1.3 Secondary Pytorch Lightning baseline models
The base code for our three classifiers is a reimplementation of a HuggingFace BERT-based uncased
sequence classifier in Pytorch Lightning. We use the published TextFooler binary models for baseline
results. We fine-tune secondary baseline models for the IMDB and MNLI tasks, to validate our code
and the training parameters. After a random hyperparameter search, we select 5 training epochs and a
batch size of 32 (MNLI) and 20 (IMDB) with a learning rate of 2 ∗ 10−5 and no weight decay. Adam
epsilon is maintained consistently at 1 ∗ 10−8.
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2.1.4 Fuzzy sentence ensemble - FuSE
Figure 2: FuSE perturbation method
The hypothesis for FuSE is that sam-
pling nearest neighbors for a word
will provide, on average, better clas-
sification outputs. In other words,
most neighboring words will provide
correct classification rather than ad-
versarial classification results. FuSE
uses SWITCH to determine the most
important words to the classification
through gradient computation. Af-
ter determining the important words,
SWITCH provides alternative sam-
ple formulations by changing those
words with a number of neighboring
words. Using this method, FuSE as-
sembles a random number of alterna-
tive sample sentences and evaluates
all of them against the underlying sen-
timent or entailment classifier, as seen
in figure 2. FuSE outputs either syn-
thetic logits representing a majority
vote count of classifications for the
samples ("majority vote"), or the aver-
age of the logits across the samples
("logit-averaging"). Tunable hyper-
parameters are all SWITCH param-
eters, plus the selection of the voting
method.
2.1.5 Fuzzy internal vector ensemble - FIVE
Figure 3: FIVE perturbation method
FIVE is based on the hypoth-
esis that averaging over neigh-
borhoods of embedding vectors,
evaluated in the context of the
sample, leads to more stable av-
erage classifications than evalu-
ating based on a particular em-
bedding that might have been
changed by an adversary like
TextFooler. FIVE asks SWITCH
to identify the most important
word by gradient computation,
and then creates additional syn-
thetic samples by perturbing
their token embedding vectors,
as seen in figure 3. Each set
of perturbed embeddings forms
a Gaussian distribution around
their original vector. Like FuSE,
FIVE outputs either synthetic
logits representing a vote count
of classifications for the samples ("majority vote"), or the average of the logits across the samples
("logit-averaging"). Tunable hyperparameters include the number of embeddings to perturb, number
of perturbed samples to generate, the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution to create around
the original embeddings, and the voting method for combining the individual synthetic sample votes.
4
2.1.6 Fuzzy adversarial co-tuning - FACT
Figure 4: FACT in-batch co-tuning
In our third, fine-tuning-based ap-
proach, we introduce a little language
diversity to the tuning process to teach
the FACT classifier that there are mul-
tiple ways to express our original sen-
timent or entailed fact. In this way,
we are fine-tuning BERT to become
less sensitive to the very specific ad-
versarial examples TextFooler gener-
ates. FACT uses SWITCH to identify
important words and provide alterna-
tive samples, which are injected se-
quentially inside the batch during the
fine-tuning process (Figure 4). The
advantage of this approach is that, af-
ter fine-tuning, we can just deploy a
new binary model file for evaluation or use in production. On the downside, co-tuning with synthetic
samples can substantially increase the fine-tuning time depending on the number of additional sam-
ples requested. But this is performed only once, and the resulting model has no additional run-time
degradation. All SWITCH hyperparameters are tunable, and regular training hyperparameters like
batch size, learning rate, weight decay and Adam epsilon can also be adjusted.
All three classifiers inherit from our Pytorch Lightning base classifier which provides hooks for batch
extension with perturbed samples during the forward() (for FuSE and FIVE) and training_step() (for
FACT) methods. The classifiers override these extension hooks to provide diversified samples in their
respective approaches.
3 Results and conclusions
3.1 Evaluation procedures and source data
For IMDB training and evaluation, we download 50,000 IMDB labeled movie review samples
(Lakshmipathi, 2019) and split the data into 40,000, 5,000 and 5,000 samples for train, validation and
test. The data was originally curated by Stanford University (Maas et al., 2011)
For MNLI (Williams et al., 2017) training and evaluation, we download data from the GLUE baseline
repository (Wang et al., 2018). Training is performed on the provided file of 390K samples. Validation
is performed on the 10,000 samples from dev_matched. Since labels are not publicly available in the
test set, we use the 10,000 samples from dev_mismatched as our holdout for testing.
We generate adversarial samples for each of the train, validation and test sets in source data by running
the TextFooler algorithm on each of the base models for our complete data sets. The adversarial
data derived from validation samples are used for hyperparameter tuning and evaluation of our
three approaches. The adversarial samples derived from test data are reserved for single use in final
evaluation. We provide these adversarial sets for each of the tasks to further efforts in this research.
Performance under active attack by TextFooler is evaluated using the code, metrics and datasets
provided by TextFooler. A set of 1000 samples for the MNLI task was selected by the TextFooler
authors. TextFooler runs masked versions of the samples through the classifiers to establish which
words most affect the outcome. It then runs the classifier on samples with those words perturbed to
nearest neighbors until it finds good adversaries, sometimes unsuccessfully.
3.2 Hyperparameter search
Hyperparameter search for FIVE hyperparameters, and the SWITCH parameters of FuSE and FACT,
is performed in a time-boxed fashion with a random search of the hyperparameter space. Random
searches were utilized based on demonstrated benefits with this method (Bergstra and Bengio, 2012).
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3.3 Results
Model Acc. F1 score Adv. acc. Adv.
F1 score
Baseline (TF) 0.843 0.835 0.029 0.027
Baseline (New) 0.833 0.826 0.501 0.487
FIVE 0.757 0.708 0.632 0.566
FuSE 0.725 0.713 0.591 0.568
FACT 0.827 0.821 0.800 0.791
Table 1: MNLI results
Table 1 shows the results of
all classifiers against the MNLI
dataset. The original MNLI
model provided by TextFooler
serves as the baseline. Its perfor-
mance against TextFooler sam-
ples that were generated specifi-
cally against it is unsurprisingly
low. The secondary (freshly
tuned) baseline model is slightly
inferior to the TextFooler base-
line mode on originals, but
brings up the accuracy on adversarial samples substantially. FIVE achieves a substantial improvement
in the adversarial case at the expense of significantly, but not unreasonably, dampened performance on
the originals (1 perturbed embedding, std dev 8.14, 8 synthetic samples per original, logit-averaging).
For FuSE, we find similar results with slightly worse performance on original samples (2 perturbed
words, 10 candidates per word, part-of-speech matching, 14 candidates into USE, filter negative
scores, max 14 samples, logit-averaging). Co-tuning with FACT results in the best performance
against adversarials while sacrificing barely any accuracy on originals (batch size 7, 9 words to
perturb, 10 candidates per word, part-of-speech matching, 12 candidates into USE, filter negative
scores, max 4 samples).
Model Acc. F1 score Adv. acc. Adv.
F1 score
Baseline (TF) 0.906 0.904 0.002 0.002
Baseline (New) 0.905 0.902 0.827 0.816
FIVE 0.884 0.867 0.620 0.586
FuSE 0.518 0.508 0.778 0.770
FACT 0.900 0.897 0.872 0.867
Table 2: IMDB results
Table 2 shows the results against
the IMDB dataset. The original
TextFooler IMDB model serves as
the baseline. The secondary (freshly
tuned) baseline model shows itself
to be basically not vulnerable to pre-
manufactured adversarial samples -
retuning addresses the problem by it-
self for this dataset. FIVE achieves
significant gains in the adversarial
case while not losing substantial ac-
curacy on the benchmarks (1 per-
turbed embedding, std dev 2.3, 10 synthetic samples per original, probability averaging). For
FuSE, we find good performance against adversarials, but a complete degradation to coin-flip level
for the original samples. More work is needed to understand this result (3 perturbed words, 10
candidates per word, part-of-speech matching, 17 candidates into USE, filter negative scores, max 12
samples, probability averaging). Co-tuning with FACT once again performs well against both original
and adversarial samples (batch size 2, 23 words to perturb, 10 candidates per word, part-of-speech
matching, 12 candidates into USE, filter negative scores, max 4 samples).
Model Org. Adv.
Acc.* Acc.*
Baseline (TF) 0.851 0.127
FUSE 0.499 0.276
FIVE 0.777 0.463
FACT 0.820 0.316
FuSE (FACT) 0.373 0.373
FIVE (FACT) 0.743 0.545
Table 3: Accuracy
under active attack
We also investigate how well our classifiers perform against an
active attack by TextFooler. This required a minimal adaptation
of TextFooler to work against our Pytorch Lightning classifiers.
Fully explaining TextFooler’s result parlance is beyond the
scope of this paper, but briefly (Table 3, all numbers generated
by TextFooler code, and adversarial accuracy "Adv. Acc*"
not directly comparable to tables 1 and 2): In our baseline
measurement, TextFooler degrades the accuracy of a BERT
sequence classifier to around 12%. We find that FACT is able
to raise that number to a significant 31% on MNLI, requiring
TextFooler to change around 30% more words and try about
30% more samples. FuSE on top of a FACT-tuned model raises
the number again. Against FIVE, with no re-tuning, TextFooler
uses about the same number of perturbed words and classifier
queries but is unable to degrade the accuracy below 45%. FIVE on top of the co-tuned FACT model
delivers the best performance of all at 54.5% accuracy.
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3.4 Analysis
Figure 5: Nearest neighbors of words (MNLI baseline)
A look at a “fooled” MNLI example can
be instructive in understanding what is
going on inside our classifiers. Here is
one from our validation set: {Premise:
“So I have to find a way to supplement
that.”, Hypothesis: “I need a way to
add something extra.”, Label: "entail-
ment"}. TextFooler is able to minimally
change the hypothesis in a way that
most of us would reasonably still clas-
sify the same way, fooling the classifier
into a “neutral” classification: {Hypoth-
esis: "I need a way to add something
additive."}. To look at what happens
in the evaluation-time classifiers FuSE
and FIVE, we will perturb only one of
the words for illustration. By computing
the gradients for the classification and
finding the input that has the largest ab-
solute gradient, SWITCH correctly de-
cides that “extra” and “additive” are the
most important words for the respective
original and adversarial hypotheses.
Figure 6: Nearest neighbors of words (MNLI FACT)
Figure 5 shows classification outcomes
for the replacement words evaluated
in the context of their respective full
premise/hypothesis pairs. The nearest
neighbors (by cosine similarity) around
the original word "extra" all lead to an
"entailment" classification. Among its
neighbors, the adversarial word "addi-
tive" is one of only two leading to a
"neutral" classification, with the major-
ity landing on "entailment". This is the
kind of example we had hoped to see -
a stable neighborhood of words around
the original, but a majority of original
classifications around the adversarial
sample. TextFooler found one isolated
word, the smallest possible nudge to
give the sample, to change the classifi-
cation. If we look at the neighborhood
as a whole and average across it, we
find a more stable classification. FuSE
won’t be fooled by TextFooler in this
example.
For co-tuning (FACT), we ask SWITCH to come up with a list of diverse replacement hypotheses: "i
need a method to additions something additive", "i need a pathway to additions something other", "i
need a manner to inserts something additional", "i need a manner to totals something add". More
points of stable classification are established with the BERT-model. Tuned on this extra set of samples,
FACT no longer considers the substitution of “additive” adversarial (figure 6).
We chose a particularly benign sample to illustrate the workings here - not all examples work out this
well. MNLI defense in particular is a difficult problem to solve at evaluation time, as it is often easy
to nudge a sample from “entailment” or “contradiction” to “neutral” with a single word perturbation,
but overwhelmingly unlikely to reverse that judgment with another random nudge.
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Figure 7: Classification fields (FIVE vector perturbation)
From the substitution of words, we now
switch into the embedding space that
contains the inputs to the actual BERT-
classifier. Figure 7 shows the classifi-
cation fields for vector perturbation of
the most important words in our sam-
ples, at a standard deviation of 0.25.
Note that this is not the best hyperpa-
rameter for classification with FIVE, but
it shows the clustering well in this t-
SNE diagram. The Gaussian regions
around both the original and the adver-
sarial words are laced with adversarial
points, and at a small standard deviation,
we will indeed find regions of predom-
inantly adversarial sentiment. With the
right tuning, however, we find a stan-
dard deviation hyperparameter at which
the adversarial classification represents
only small pockets, and as we are averaging over the cluster, FIVE comes to the right conclusion for
this example as well.
3.5 Discussion
Our first insight is that TextFooler overfits to the model it works against when generating samples.
We find that adversarial samples generated from one model (e.g. the original MNLI model from Jin
et al. (2019)) will fool a second model (e.g. the secondary MNLI model tuned on PyTorch Lightning)
in only half the circumstances. The same results are also true in the reverse (e.g. samples generated
from the Lightning model will fool the original model only half the time). This leads us to suspect
that TextFooler works to find the weak points in the specific way a model is parameterized.
FuSE delivers a solid performance on the MNLI task, and fails spectacularly on regular (non-
adversarial) IMDB samples, achieving nothing more significant than coin-flip performance in the
most “conservative” of our hyperparameter searches. More investigation is needed to understand this
failure, especially since its performance against pre-made adversaries is substantial at 77% accuracy.
We find that co-tuning with SWITCH is a very effective way to protect a model against TextFooler’s
original samples. We also see that evaluation-time perturbation can improve adversarial results,
trading in a few degrees of task accuracy for a good degree of adversarial protection. Additionally,
active attack query-count results show that the co-tuned models get harder to fool in generating
new sets of samples for MNLI, but not for IMDB. We suspect this is because the sentence length is
much larger in IMDB than in MNLI, and therefore gives TextFooler more possible word choices in
perturbation.
However, our most resilient model against active attack is the FIVE classifier, which preserves
accuracy to 45% (55% on top of FACT). We theorize that it is the stronger random aspect of Gaussian
perturbation that makes FIVE a moving target for TextFooler. FIVE also delivers a solid performance
against pre-made adversarial samples, which, together with its efficiently parallelizable approach,
makes it attractive for further research.
3.6 Conclusion
We show that BERT-based classifiers can be hardened against both pre-made adversarial samples
and active attack by a mechanism like TextFooler. The price for such improvements is some loss
in accuracy on non-adversarial samples ranging from insignificant, as seen in the performance of
our co-tuned model against pre-made samples, to substantial (10-20%), as for the drops in regular
benchmark metrics for our evaluation-time classifiers under attack by TextFooler.
Future work should investigate the failure of FuSE to perform on the regular IMDB benchmark,
combine some of our approaches into a single classifier, and tune the algorithm and implementation
to allow for a longer hyperparameter search.
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Broader Impact
BERT pre-trained classifiers opened the field of NLP classifiers to many practical applications,
including sentiment and entailment classification. BERT-based classifiers score consistently high
benchmark numbers (Devlin et al., 2018). All that is left is the actual classification task, factoring out
much of the daunting NLP aspect of such any text classification project. But can such classification
be trusted, and to what degree? When text classification becomes usable, it also becomes tempting to
use it as a replacement for human judgment. With popularity comes attack surface: Such classifiers
were shown to be vulnerable to black-box trial-and-error antagonists like TextFooler (Jin et al., 2019).
These mechanisms use exhaustive search to produce adversarial examples that lead the classifier to
the wrong result in over 90% of samples examined, even when those samples were judged to be
semantically equivalent by humans. Can classifiers be hardened against such attacks?
These questions need to be answered before we apply text classifiers to all kinds of applications as
gatekeepers of civility and true representation of sentiments. Hardening classifiers against manipula-
tion will protect meme-browsing youths and other vulnerable population segments from predatory
individuals and trouble-seeking trolls, just as it will protect intellectual property investments by
thwarting manipulation of reviews and recommendations.
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